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Debates over informal or popular justice recur periodically in sociolegal 
scholarship. The topic received extensive discussion in the 1980’s, but much less in the 
1990’s. While most U.S. scholars were focusing elsewhere, however, the practice of 
informal justice has continued to grow. A type of informal justice known generally as 
“restorative justice” is spreading rapidly in the arena of criminal justice. In the latter half 
of the 1990’s the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored several conferences on restorative 
justice and began funding pilot programs (Department of Justice, 1998). According to 
one of its main advocates, Mark Umbreit, all fifty states have restorative justice programs 
in some stage of development (2001, xxxvi). Nor is interest limited to the United States. 
Umbreit (2001, xlv) counts over a thousand programs in sixteen other countries. In 1999 
the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council passed a resolution endorsing the 
principles of restorative justice (United Nations 1999). With this large presence in legal 
practice, restorative justice deserves the attention of sociolegal scholars to see whether 
evolution in practice and/or theory reveals new insights about informal justice. 
One of the major criticisms of informal justice in the 1980’s was that it tended to 
increase rather than decrease state control over minor disputes (Abel 1982; Harrington 
1985), but subsequent sociolegal scholarship questioned the implied dichotomy between 
state and community control (Matthews 1988; Fitzpatrick 1988). We focus here on the 
role of professionals as intermediaries between citizens and the state. Attending to the 
role of professionals in restorative justice programs is especially important because 
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restorative justice theory calls for criminal justice to be turned over to “the community” 
with little apparent need at all for professionals (Alford 1997). We conclude that such a 
prescription is naïve, but that professional involvement also does not have to mean state 
domination and the exclusion or cooptation of citizens. A theory of democratic 
professionalism suggests an alternative account of the zone between total control by 
either state or community that both enriches restorative justice theory and responds to 
critics of informal justice. 
 This article begins with a very brief summary of the sociolegal critique of 
informal justice. It then turns to the intellectual and practical roots of restorative justice. 
The challenge that restorative justice poses to the role of professionals in conventional 
criminal justice is summarized and a theory of democratic professionalism introduced. A 
case study of a restorative justice program in Salt Lake City, Utah, explores how the roles 
of practicing professionals committed to restorative justice differ from those in the 
conventional criminal justice process and what greater community involvement means to 
such professionals.  The structure of professional involvement in a restorative justice 
program in Vermont provides an alternative example of democratic professionalism in 
action. The conclusion identifies tensions within the theory of restorative justice and 
discusses ways in which democratic professionalism might inform restorative justice and 
justify a reconsideration of informal justice. 
Informal Justice in Sociolegal Scholarship 
During the 1970’s local programs attempting to make access to justice speedier 
and cheaper began to spread rapidly and in some cases received substantial federal 
funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of 
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Justice. This governmentally sponsored informal justice became a major focus of law and 
society scholarship in the 1980’s, and the assessment was overwhelmingly critical. 
Works by Abel (1982), Tomasic (1982), Merry (1982 and 1989), Hofrichter (1982a and 
1982b), Harrington (1985), Delgado et al. (1985), and others concluded that informal 
justice extended rather than reduced the net of state social control, failed to live up to its 
vision of non-coercive resolution, allowed more powerful parties to take advantage of 
less powerful parties, allowed more room for personal prejudice than formal processes 
do, and failed to make the courts more efficient for those cases remaining in it. Even non-
governmental, community-based programs revealed possible shortcomings such as 
benefiting the mediators more than the disputants (Merry and Milner 1993). While some 
of the governmentally sponsored programs did falter, other programs persisted and grew 
despite the scholarly critiques.  
While U.S. scholarship on informal justice dropped off dramatically after the 
critiques of the early 1980’s, by the late 1980’s “new informalist” analyses (Pavlich 
1996, 708) were already beginning to appear, primarily by British and Australian scholars 
(Matthews 1988). These scholars developed new critiques but in some cases also tried to 
salvage informal justice (Matthews 1988; Fitzpatrick 1988; Marshall 1988; Cain 1988; 
Pavlich 1996; Cobb 1997). A major contribution of the new critics is to bring in an 
analysis of social control drawn from the work of Michel Foucault. Pavlich (1996, 712) 
argues that the “old” critics of informalism inappropriately reduced the central question 
about informal justice to whether it expanded or reduced state control. This implies a 
naïve dichotomy between state control and voluntary action by unfettered individuals. 
Instead, according to Fitzpatrick (1988: 190-92), these two domains are mutually 
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constitutive social fields in which the identity of law relies on the presence of an informal 
domain and vice versa. 
Social control then is not as centralized and top-down as the old critics assumed. 
In modern liberal societies individuals are shaped by regulatory practices in an 
intermediate realm Foucault called “governmentality” in areas such as health, welfare, 
and education. In this realm of governmentality professionals play a crucial role. In their 
work professionals are under varying degrees of direct state control, but are permitted 
their privileges of autonomy because their work sustains conditions approved by the 
state. Power in this realm is diffuse and lacking in accountability. Specifically with 
respect to informal justice, Matthews (1988: 19) describes this intermediate realm 
between centralized state power and individual freedom as “a site of struggle over 
competencies, knowledges, and privileges.” 
We find this characterizes well the situation of criminal justice professionals vis-
à-vis restorative justice. Restorative justice theory leaves virtually no role for 
professionals, yet in practice they are deeply involved in restorative justice programs. In 
many cases, such as the ones we discuss here, professionals have spearheaded restorative 
justice programs. These professionals are philosophically committed to direct 
involvement of victims and the broader community in criminal justice and yet are also 
bound by norms of fairness for criminal defendants. Juggling these commitments leads to 
a reconstitution of their roles in ways that differ from the norms found in both restorative 
justice theory and the current criminal justice system. 
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Restorative Justice in Practice and Theory  
 Restorative justice attempts to reconstitute the way people think about crime. 
Restorative justice advocates argue that crime is more importantly a harm committed 
against individual victims and secondarily against a community than it is a breach of state 
laws. Repairing this harm is deemed more important than punishing the offender. By 
minimizing the governmental role in criminal justice and making the victim the central 
party, restorative justice recasts criminal justice more like civil law. In blurring the 
distinction between civil and criminal law, restorative justice is like other versions of 
informal justice, but its activist roots in North America lie in religiously-based critiques 
of penal practices and its theoretical roots in a critique of dominant theories of 
criminology.1  
The origins of the restorative justice movement were contemporaneous in time 
but distant in geography and philosophy from the neighborhood justice centers piloted by 
the U.S. Department of Justice during the 1970’s (Tomasic and Feeley 1982; Harrington 
1985). Although neighborhood justice centers had their roots in prosecutors’ perceptions 
of the need for better handling of minor criminal offenses (McGillis 1982, 64), most 
came to handle minor civil disputes as well as criminal cases. Indeed, some critiques of 
such programs emphasized their displacement of civil more than criminal procedures. For 
example, the informal justice movement’s multiple ideological projects, identified by 
Harrington and Merry (1988), addressed concerns more commonly arising in civil 
litigation, such as backlog and delay and excessively adversarial proceedings between 
parties who need to sustain ongoing relationships. Other critics of informal justice saw it 
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as motivated by the growing degree of success by have-not plaintiffs against powerful 
defendants. 
By comparison, while the emphasis on the victim in restorative justice certainly 
makes it more like civil justice than conventional criminal justice is, restorative justice is 
firmly grounded in both practice and theory in critiques of criminal justice. Restorative 
justice practitioners in North America generally trace its roots to programs organized by 
members of the Mennonite Central Committee working with probation officers, first near 
Kitchener, Ontario, in 1974, and then in Elkhart, Indiana, in 1978 (Umbreit 2001, xlii-
xliii; Van Ness and Strong 1997, 21; Zehr 1990, 158-59). Some also credit the prison 
reform efforts of the American Friends Service Committee in the 1960s and 1970s as 
influencing the development of restorative justice (Van Ness and Strong 1997, 22-23).  
Several strands of criticism of the contemporary criminal justice system have 
contributed to restorative justice (Van Ness and Strong 1997, chap. 2). The first is the 
lack of concern for victims. Victims are typically left out of the criminal justice process 
entirely, unless the prosecutor wishes to call them as witnesses. Victim advocates have 
called on the justice system to provide victims with restitution, needed services, and an 
active role in the process, such as the right to make a statement at the time of sentencing 
about the impact of the crime (McDonald 1976).   
 A second strand of criticism that has contributed to restorative justice notes the 
failure of the conventional process to significantly reduce crime generally and recidivism 
in particular. Proponents of restorative justice, however, do not look to harsher and/or 
more certain punishments to deter or incapacitate repeat offenders. They are likely to 
believe that putting offenders in jails and prisons reinforces more than deters criminality 
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and fails to provide offenders with the skills they need to successfully reintegrate into 
communities (Zehr 1990). On the other hand, they also criticize the adversary system for 
removing from offenders the need to take responsibility for their actions and look instead 
to John Braithwaite’s criminological theory of “reintegrative shaming” (1989), which 
holds that communities should condemn harmful actions but then reintegrate offenders 
back into the community. 
 Victim-offender mediation (VOM) or reconciliation emerged as a reform 
movement responding to these two perceived shortcomings. VOM brings victims and 
offenders into face-to-face contact. For victims direct participation is valued because it 
acknowledges the importance of what happened to them, gives them considerable control 
over the outcome, and may well be therapeutic in restoring them to their condition before 
the crime. Offenders are expected to take personal responsibility for their actions, for it is 
through this that they come to understand the consequences of their actions and have a 
chance to restore the ruptured relationships. Because the emphasis on taking 
responsibility for one’s actions excludes people who deny they committed the acts in the 
first place, restorative justice theorists often acknowledge that the theory does not apply 
to the blame-fixing stage of the criminal justice process (Karp and Clear 2000), which 
further differentiates VOM from civil alternative dispute resolution.  
Restorative justice programs vary considerably in their specifics, but they 
generally try to maintain the goals of VOM while adding some type of community 
involvement (Bazemore 1998; Bazemore and Umbreit 2001). Community members are 
considered indirect parties because they may fear becoming victims themselves in the 
future, may wish to reaffirm the norms violated by the criminal conduct, and undoubtedly 
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absorb the financial costs of the insuring against crime and responding to it when it 
occurs. Moreover, they are often seen as bringing an ability to “connect with” the victim 
and offender and support them as they try to repair the harm from the crime (Dzur and 
Olson, forthcoming). 
Anti-professionalism in Restorative Justice  
 An underlying theme in calls for community involvement and victim-offender 
mediation is the desirability of reducing professional control of criminal justice. In an 
influential early article, Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie (1977) accuses the state 
via its lawyers and “treatment personnel” of “stealing” conflicts from the direct parties 
and taking away not only the victims’ direct compensation, but also the victims’ and their 
communities’ opportunity for participation, fuller understanding, and norm clarification.  
 Restorative justice theory often follows Christie’s lead in recounting the historical 
evolution of criminal justice from individual or family control to state monopoly. Zehr 
(1990, 101) describes people in medieval Europe as turning to the “judicial option” only 
when private justice failed. Such public justice was then still entirely at the initiative and 
in the control of the victim or victim’s family. Gradually, a public investigator became 
the public accuser, and as governmental power centralized, the state became defined as 
the victim of the crime and the recipient of fines levied on the offender. 
 Restorative justice theorists are skeptical of the usual justification of state 
monopoly: putting the pursuit of justice in public hands avoids private vengeance and the 
risk of escalation of social violence (Zehr 1990, 98; Christie 1977, 1981). Zehr (1990, 
100) describes the pre-state-controlled system as not “private justice” but “community 
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justice” because “[c]hurch and community leaders often played central roles in 
negotiating or arbitrating settlements, registering agreements once they were made.”2 
 While not often explicitly articulated, the implied distinction between 
“community” and “state” pervades restorative justice theory, just as it did in the early-
1980s critiques of informal justice. Zehr (1990, 119) views the post-Enlightenment 
development of more democratic governments as not blurring this distinction but merely 
“legitimating” the state: “If the state represented the will and interests of the public, it 
was easier to justify defining the state as victim and giving up to the state a monopoly on 
intervention.”  
If the state and community are dichotomized, criminal justice professionals are 
clearly representatives of the state. Judges, prosecutors, and probation officers are direct 
employees of the government. Even when not public employees, defense attorneys are 
considered “officers of the court.” By viewing the victim, offender, and community 
rather than the state as the central parties in criminal acts, restorative justice theory seems 
to imply little need for criminal justice professionals at all. Indeed, there is minimal 
discussion in the restorative justice literature about the nature of the roles that 
professionals might play in a criminal justice system reoriented according to restorative 
justice principles (but see Bazemore 1998, 348-53), except for publications aimed 
specifically at such professionals (Harris and Corbett 1998; Umbreit and Carey 1995; 
Gay and Quinn 1996). 
Notwithstanding this implication in the theoretical literature, in practice a great 
deal of the initiative for restorative justice programs has come and continues to come 
from professionals within the criminal justice system. Indeed, one can even present 
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restorative justice as a program for professional renewal. One article promoting 
restorative justice to corrections professionals touts its ability to reenergize their original 
motivations for entering the field: “to promote offender change, to assist crime victims 
toward wholeness, and to make individual communities safer” (Umbreit and Carey 1995, 
2).  The least charitable interpretation of professional involvement in restorative justice is 
that professionals only use the rhetoric of restorative justice to obfuscate the extension of 
their own control, as the harshest critics of the informal justice movement of the 1970s 
suggested. Our observations show, however, that the professionals in the restorative 
justice programs we have studied appear sincerely motivated to hand over at least some 
power to victims and community members. Nonetheless, such a shift of power does not 
occur seamlessly or without ambivalence, and doing so certainly creates the need to 
reconceptualize professional roles as some traditional ones are changed or eliminated. 
In the conventional criminal justice system, professional expertise focuses on 
issues of substantive law, procedural law, and sentencing. Substantive law is important 
because crime is conceptualized as breaking the laws of the state. Since punishing 
offenders for breaking these laws is the central goal of the criminal justice system, 
procedural expertise is essential so that the punishment is imposed fairly. Except in the 
rare instances when delegated to juries, sentencing decisions are in the hands of judges, 
attorneys if plea bargained, and/or “treatment personnel,” such as probation and parole 
officers. 
Professional responsibilities in these areas become specialized and routinized. The 
focus on punishment makes very important the norm of due process for the offender, and 
this is achieved through specialized roles and standardized procedures. The professionals 
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each employ their particular expertise to fulfill their designated role. Defense attorneys 
represent their clients, either in trial or plea negotiations; judges stay neutral, “umpire,” 
and adjudicate; probation officers assess attitudes, dangerousness and prospects for 
rehabilitation.  
Reliance on roles corresponding to specialized expertise has corollary effects on 
professionals’ scope of responsibility and standards of accountability. Professional roles 
are compartmentalized. The professionals’ responsibility is to do their specific duty in the 
process, according to professional standards of conduct. For example, the attorneys at 
trial are accountable to do a good job of voir dire and cross-examination and summation. 
They are not necessarily accountable for the outcome of the individual case, much less 
whether the offenders reoffend or the victims put their lives back together. While elected 
prosecutors and judges may at times be held responsible for a community’s general level 
of crime, the usual standard of accountability is a narrow measure of conviction rate or 
sentencing severity. 
Restorative justice theory, by contrast, eschews professional expertise in 
substantive law, procedure, or sentencing and envisions different human interactions 
among the parties. Direct participation by victim, offender, and community is needed 
because the restoration of violated or ruptured human relationships, not punishing 
offenders, is the central goal of criminal justice (Zehr 1990).  Experts in substantive 
criminal law are not needed because crime is a matter of violating community norms, 
which are widely known by definition. With respect to procedure and sanctions, 
restorative justice theory emphasizes the unique circumstance of each crime and does not 
assume that the same treatment is appropriate for all. Indeed, formal equality may 
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reinforce actual inequality (Zehr 1990, 79). Participants relate to each other holistically 
and fluidly as unique individuals. 
With these values and goals, then, is there indeed no role for professionals in 
restorative justice? Even as harsh a critic as Christie perceives a possible role for 
professionals as “resource-persons, answering when asked, but not domineering, not in 
the center” (1977: 12). Christie’s vision, however, assumes a different public from the 
one we currently see. If the professionals are not now accountable for the overall 
outcomes in the criminal justice system, neither is the public. By having turned the 
criminal justice system over to professionals, most ordinary citizens feel there is little 
they can or should be expected to do about it, even if they are dissatisfied with the level 
of crime in their community. Thus, even if it is true historically that professionals have 
“stolen” the community’s conflicts, as Christie argues, there is little current evidence that 
the community is making vigorous efforts to get them back.   
The concept of  “democratic professionalism” says that professional expertise can 
be directed toward facilitating public participation and control (Dzur 2002a and 2002b).  
Under this idea professionals do not inevitably reduce the sphere of lay or citizen 
involvement, but share decision making domains rather than monopolizing them as 
Christie feared (1977: 7). Democratic professionalism suggests a concept of 
professionalism with different roles and different expertise. 
A Theory of Democratic Professionalism 
Democratic professionalism steers a middle course between the apolitical view of 
professions common in mainstream studies of professionalism and the view of radical 
critics like Christie.  Common to mainstream studies is a view of professions as 
 13 
“trustees” of public interests.  Though rarely held in a pure form in sociological 
descriptions or ethical theories of professional action, the social trustee ideal has played a 
major role in how sociologists, philosophers, and professionals themselves have 
understood professions as being different from other economic actors and as having 
special responsibilities to the larger society.   
The social trustee ideal holds that professionals have social responsibilities in 
addition to their fiduciary and function-specific obligations to their base of clients.  To 
count as a profession, in Talcott Parsons’ foundational account, an occupation must have 
a sense of such broader responsibility: “a full-fledged profession must have some 
institutional means of making sure that such competence will be put to socially 
responsible uses” (1968, 536).  In addition to the healing of particular clients, the medical 
profession contributes to larger social goals such as the cure of disease and other large-
scale improvements in health and well-being (Parsons 1968, 536).  In addition to 
defending the rights and advancing the interests of particular clients, the legal profession 
embodies and upholds the social conception of justice, what Parsons calls “the moral 
consensus (incomplete as it is) of American society” (1968, 544).3   
Social trustee professionalism emerges in the 1860s and is a prominent ideal in 
the century that follows for both established professions like law and medicine and for 
newer professions striving for status, like engineers and social workers (Brint 1994, 5).  If 
social trustee professionals represented public interests, however, this representation was 
at a fairly high level of abstraction.  Serving the “community” was not seen as something 
the community had much of a say in determining.4  An economy of trust emerged: 
professionals earned social trust by performing such general social functions with a high 
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degree of competence, and they spent it by insisting that they knew best how to govern 
themselves and establish their own standards of action.    
The apolitical image of professional responsibilities to the public presented by the 
social trustee ideal is strongly challenged by the view of radical critics of the 1970s, such 
as Foucault and Habermas, who lamented the detrimental effects of “technocratic” 
professional action in democracies that, to paraphrase Habermas, takes the most critical 
aspects of public decisions out of the hands of both the voters and the politicians (1971, 
63). Far from representatives of the public interest, under this critique professions are 
seen as impediments to the democratic expression of public interests.  Expertise grounded 
in the methods and language of positivist social science pushes the local knowledge of 
lay participants out of serious policy arenas.  
Nils Christie echoes these themes when he draws attention to professional task 
monopolization that shrinks the space of democratic authority and immobilizes citizens 
who might occupy that space (1977).   Professions shrink the space of democratic 
authority when they claim expertise and authority over tasks involved in achieving public 
purposes like criminal justice that could conceivably be done by lay people, tasks such as 
crime prevention, trials, and sentencing.  Sometimes professionals quite literally shrink 
the space of participation when they decide public issues off in professional buildings and 
administrative complexes, far from potential sites of participation.   
In addition to taking over public-oriented tasks, professions may immobilize 
because their sophistication in policing, adjudicating and sentencing makes people less 
comfortable with relying on their own devices for social order and justice.  Further, as 
critics like Foucault pointed out, individual citizens, social movements, communities, the 
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“general public” become reflected back to themselves by the professions (Foucault 1980).  
Professions, along with providing services, mediate relations with selves, other 
individuals, and groups.  Through the mediation of psychologists, lawyers, public 
administrators, among others, people can lose faith in how capable they are as persons, 
how capable their neighbors are, and how capable non-professionals are in collective 
decision making. 
The radical critics’ response to technocratic professionalism was to undermine the 
positivist underpinnings of the alleged expertise of criminologists, policy scientists, and 
others, and to suggest, where possible, the use of lay dominated forums of public choice.  
During a period of comparatively high (in comparison to contemporary rates) civic 
participation as the 1960s and the early 1970s (Putnam 2000), such hope for lay 
participation did not seem misplaced, but even so it is important to notice the irony that 
some of the loudest calls for more lay participation and a different kind of relation 
between citizens and professions were heard from people, like Christie, Foucault, and 
Habermas, trained for and occupying sites of considerable professional authority.   
The ideal of democratic professionalism flips the radical critique around, jujitsu-
style, and argues that if professions can be a buffer between elites and citizens, they can 
also remove themselves as a buffer; if they can take tasks away from the public and 
immobilize civic action, they can give these tasks back and activate civic action; if critics 
of the professions can be self-aware enough to recognize the faults and limits of 
technocracy, then so can other professionals trained in similar institutions and affected by 
the same currents of thought. 
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Democratic professionalism has a thin but important line of scholarly support in 
democratic theory that helps explain why task sharing rather than task monopoly might 
come to be desirable to professionals.  Canonical democratic theorists Alexis de 
Tocqueville and John Dewey both stressed the vulnerability of professional domains to 
legitimacy threats from distant publics.  For Tocqueville, lay participation in juries 
socialized citizens into respect for legal procedures and for the judges who had 
professional mastery of them.  Without this socialization, citizens can see judges as alien 
figures of questionable authority.  The jury “spreads to all classes respect for the thing 
judged and the idea of right.  Remove these two things, and love of independence will be 
no more than a destructive passion” (Tocqueville 2000: 262).   
Dewey suggested a different threat to legitimacy. Without the local knowledge of 
the communities affected by social problems like crime or joblessness, technocratic 
experts simply could not adequately solve those problems.  Experts in social policy do 
not remain experts long if their inquiry is not substantially reflexive, if their inquiry is 
engaged in the problems of specialists rather than the felt problems of the public.  “A 
class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class 
with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at 
all” (Dewey 1927: 364).5 
In the Public and Its Problems and elsewhere, Dewey indicated that certain 
professions could serve as democratic catalysts--intermediaries between a fragmented 
and under-informed public and a distant and increasingly complex political system.  
Dewey had in mind journalists, social scientists, and educators--these were his 
democratic professionals.  They were to provide analyses and information but also 
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encourage reflection about large-scale economic and political events, and most 
importantly to encourage a form of self-recognition on the part of nascent publics formed 
around key social problems.  The press, for example, was to be a “continuous, systematic 
and effective revelation of social movements” (1925, 219), something it performed by 
becoming both more social scientific in its analyses and more aesthetic in its narrative 
delivery.  
Dewey conceived of democratic professionals as task sharers, not political leaders 
or public organizers or philanthropists who seek to produce social goods for the public.  
Instead, Dewey’s democratic professionals respond to social problems in a way that 
facilitates the organization of the public.  For example, Dewey saw educators as 
democratic professionals who can structure learning environments for students to work 
and deliberate together.  In Dewey’s model schools, children are initiated into the 
participatory and deliberative mode of life characteristic of a task-sharing democracy.  
Students are encouraged in group practice to place their beliefs in question, rely on 
evidence and argument for authority, be willing to answer challenges, and be receptive to 
new perspectives.  In other words, Dewey’s democratic educators help structure their 
schools so that students have a taste for collective self-determination (Dewey 1937, 181).  
Democratic professionals seek to open up their domains of authority to lay 
participants, to share tasks and to share in the construction of the norms that constrain and 
direct professional action.  Along with the restorative justice movement in the criminal 
justice domain, other contemporary democratic professional movements include the 
public journalism reform movement and the bioethics movement within medicine (Dzur 
2002a and 2002b).  In seeking to change key governing norms of practice within criminal 
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justice, journalism, and medicine, they see their own domains as having positive 
democratic potential.  What these reformers see that radical critics of technocratic 
professionalism missed is the possibility that professionals might have a hand in 
reversing trends in democratic contraction and civic immobility.  Further, like 
Tocqueville and Dewey, contemporary reformers see how a merely commercial or 
merely technocratic professionalism makes their own practices vulnerable to public 
skepticism.  
Democratic professionals are not necessarily idealistic or altruistic. Contemporary 
social and political theorists building on Dewey’s work have pointed to three reasons 
behind democratic professionalism. One motivation, integrity, is what individual 
members have to gain from their professions when they are oriented towards public good 
rather than mere commercial gain.  Professions are ways of life that further public 
purposes and because of this they are able to grant meaning to the work-lives of 
individual professionals (Sullivan 1995, 6).   
Another reason, security, or professional legitimacy, is what professions, as 
organizations, have to gain from the right sort of relationship with the public.  
Professional work is particularly vulnerable to public recognition since it is often 
dependent upon “public, legal acceptance of the value of services offered by the 
professional” (Sullivan 1995, 30).  For example, surgeons are exempt from the criminal 
justice constraints preventing ordinary citizens from approaching strangers with sharp 
instruments with invasive intent, but society can also retract such exemptions.  As 
Sullivan writes, the “security and negotiability of the professional’s human capital 
exists…only as part of the public order of civil society.  Even more than most other kinds 
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of property, professional capital depends upon civil society’s structure of legal 
procedures and reasonings” (Sullivan 1995, 145). The authority and autonomy 
professions have to solve key social problems are based on reciprocal trust, something 
they earn by performing their tasks with social good, not just profit, in mind.  
Professionals unreflective about their impact on the public good not only risk loss of 
integrity, but also risk loss of the legal legitimacy they need to operate. 
A third reason is the value of democracy itself: professionals can help preserve 
democratic control of collective decisions against the pressures of technocratic control.  
Proponents of democratic professionalism see few signs of the engaged, rational polity 
that Dewey imagined and worry about the roles contemporary professionals play in the 
“hierarchical and asymmetrical decision structures of the corporate-bureaucratic state.” 
Instead, they see a political environment marked by citizen apathy and inefficacy in the 
face of expert systems of social coordination and control (Fischer 1993, 167; Fischer 
2000, 30).  Technocratic professionals and experts play the role of buffers between 
citizens and elites by accommodating “the client’s needs and problems to the structures 
of a larger system of domination and control” (Fischer 1993, 169).  As the supposed 
technocratic benefits of efficiency and competence are subjected to increasing scrutiny, 
however, the virtues of a more democratic professionalism are coming to be recognized 
by professionals and citizens alike as a barrier against technocratic authority that 
constrains democratically coordinated social action. 
So what explains the democratic professional, the judge, the administrator, the 
journalist, social scientist, or educator who opposes technocratic authority and who 
promotes the formation of engaged publics?  Professions do this to help promote 
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democratic citizenship, that is, to uphold the value of democracy. But they facilitate lay 
participation, too, because it serves the professional’s interest in gaining the security and 
integrity that help the profession itself function and get its job done better. 
None of this is to say that democratic professionalism is easy. The ideal is quite 
complex (Dzur 2002a and 2002b). For example, Dewey expects social scientists to be 
both competent researchers under the rules of their disciplines and good facilitators of 
community participation.  In the demand that professionals both exercise authority and 
share it, democratic professionals face serious value trade-offs, as in the case of 
Tocqueville’s judge who knows his solo decision would be more just, yet defers to the 
jury as a rule because of the political socialization benefits of lay participation.  The ideal 
is also, no doubt, overly ambitious as shown by the hope that the judge, the social 
scientist, the educator, and others can remedy serious structural deficits in the civic 
environment.  At least democratic professionals within criminal justice are only trying to 
increase citizen involvement in their specific policy domain, rather than in public 
decision-making generally, as educators or journalists might, but they certainly face 
complexities and trade-offs nonetheless. 
As democratic professionals, they need to retain a certain degree of separate 
authority and autonomy grounded in both the competence and skill values of the social 
trustee model, and in the participatory democratic values stressed by radical critics.  As 
democratic professionals, they are concerned about the effects of their expertise on the 
lay public’s ability to make self-confident choices both inside and outside their 
professional domain.  Though they retain the authority and at least somewhat privileged 
voice of people with experience and specialized training, they recognize that they may 
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know only part of what is important in reaching a decision about a treatment plan, a 
service, a public policy that relates to their area of expertise.  Above all, they seek to open 
up their domains to other voices, other experiences by mobilizing, actively recruiting, and 
including lay participants in both decision-making and agenda-setting capacities. 
We propose that the concept of democratic professionalism complements the 
theory of restorative justice by helping to explain why professionals have been so 
involved in a movement that claims not to need them, by identifying what professionals 
contribute to the practice of restorative justice, and by suggesting standards to consider in 
assessing the role such professionals play. The concept of democratic professionalism 
brings out a significant and meaningful dimension of restorative justice practice lost in 
most current discussions of restorative justice.  Ideally, democratic professionals may 
also help shape restorative justice in ways that address some of the problems perceived 
with many earlier efforts at informal justice. On a more practical level, we believe that 
democratic professionalism characterizes what many restorative justice professionals are 
doing: re-professionalizing towards a more democratic practice. 
Our principal case study examines professionals attempting to share authority 
with citizens in a restorative justice program in Salt Lake City, Utah, entitled “Passages.” 
Sparked, in part, by the interest in restorative justice of Salt Lake City’s progressive 
mayor, Passages was planned and developed in spring 2000, with the first cases heard in 
fall 2000.  The program is described here as it functioned from September 2000 through 
December 2001, with more recent developments noted as appropriate. We draw upon 
direct observations of biweekly meetings and other program-related events, interviews 
with the participating community members and professionals, and written program 
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descriptions, newspaper accounts, etc. This evidence enables us to begin to identify the 
meaning that some professionals attribute to community involvement and the 
professional tasks entailed in facilitating greater community involvement in criminal 
justice.  We do not here discuss the program’s impact on the offenders, but focus 
exclusively on the roles that professionals play vis-à-vis community members.  
We realize that other restorative justice programs structure professional and 
community involvement in different ways and each program depends heavily on unique 
circumstances, so that this one program should not stand for all of restorative justice. 
Furthermore, the program was in its infancy, and the roles of professionals and 
community members have evolved since its early months. To provide comparison with 
another program that structures professional and citizen roles differently, we offer a much 
briefer account of a restorative justice program in Vermont. 
Restorative Justice in Practice: The Salt Lake City “Passages” Program 
Passages has four professional stakeholders (Rolly 2000): the city prosecutor’s 
office, legal defender’s office, court, and probation services. The chief City Prosecutor 
appointed by the new mayor was a galvanizing force in the formation of Passages (Walsh 
2002). For its first year this chief prosecutor personally sat on the community board 
described below. Subsequently an assistant city prosecutor participated in the bi-weekly 
meetings. The head of the misdemeanor section of the Legal Defender’s Association, the 
second stakeholder, was active at the planning stage and also sat on the board. Invited by 
the prosecutor, a judge of the state general jurisdiction trial court agreed to participate in 
the program.6  Salt Lake County Division of Criminal Justice Services, the fourth 
stakeholder, provided a meeting place for the community review panel, therapeutic 
 23 
courses for offenders participating in Passages, and the critically important time of a part-
time case manager who interviewed offenders and wrote up assessments to be considered 
by the board and was the contact person for both offenders and board members.  The 
program’s budgetary needs were minimal, consisting of a part-time salary for the case-
manager and seats in therapeutic courses; the public defender and city prosecutor 
volunteered their services at the after-hours meetings.  
The participating judge referred cases to Passages at the time of arraignment or 
pre-trial hearing at the request of the City Prosecutor’s Office.7  Defendants were offered 
a plea in abeyance, which means that a defendant pleads guilty but that the prosecution 
would ask the court not to enter judgment but dismiss the case once the conditions of the 
Passages program were completed. Candidates for Passages were given three days after 
entering the plea in abeyance to contact Salt Lake County Criminal Justice Services to 
schedule a pre-program evaluation.   
Strict guidelines governed the selection of offenders deemed appropriate for 
Passages.  Offenders who had committed felonies were not admitted, nor were those who 
had a history of violence or a history of failure to appear for court hearings.8  Anxious to 
have the new program succeed, the prosecutor was initially very cautious about the cases 
referred, even beyond the formal criteria. All but 11 of the 35 cases referred during the 
observation period were shoplifts or employee thefts, which presumably affected the 
demographics of the program. 
From September 2000 through December 2001 there were 35 participants: 17 
men, 18 women; one black, 6 hispanics, 28 non-hispanic whites. The mean age was 24, 
the median just over 20. Other offenses committed by program participants included 
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unlawful possession of alcohol, drunk and disorderly, hazing, stealing money from an 
acquaintance’s purse, and stealing luggage from an airport carousel.  
The offenders met as a group with the community review panel [CRP or “board”] 
in a room on a corridor in the Salt Lake County Criminal Justice Services building where 
therapeutic classes were going on at the same time for others under the supervision of the 
division.  During the observation period, the CRP was evenly divided in number between 
the city prosecutor, public defender, and case manager and three community members.9  
Though in theory members of the public could attend the meeting, no one other than the 
board and the offenders (and occasionally one of their friends or family members) 
attended during the sixteen months of our observations.10   
A half hour before every meeting the CRP met without the offenders present.  In 
this half hour the case manager introduced new participants by handing out copies of 
“Passages Needs Assessments,” stating the name and date of birth of the offender, the 
circumstances of the criminal charges, a very brief summary of the individual’s personal 
circumstances (previous criminal offenses, family and marital status, mental and physical 
health, evidence of substance abuse), and recommended sanctions.  The case manager 
also handed out an agenda for the board meeting with a progress report and update on the 
other program participants the board would talk with that evening.   
When the formal meeting began, the offenders entered the room and were invited, 
one at a time, to sit at a seat at the CRP table facing the members of the board, while the 
other offenders remained as an audience.  During these board-offender encounters, which 
usually lasted only a few minutes, board members affirmed the remaining requirements 
to be met by the offender--such as the number, type, and date of therapeutic classes to be 
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taken--and usually praised the tasks already completed. Most of the participants seemed 
contrite and cooperative from the outset. Roughly one third of the total established quite 
friendly relations with the panel members, exchanging banter or reporting progress with 
pride. On the other hand, nearly one quarter were more resistant to the program, giving 
the impression they considered it excessive for the offense they had committed. 
Passages was divided into three phases, or periods in which the demands on 
offenders changed in character.  Phase one included an introductory meeting with the 
CRP in which the offenders discussed written answers they had prepared to a list of 
questions about the offense, such as how it may have harmed the victim and community.  
During this phase, which lasted about a month, the offender had to meet every other week 
with the board at its regularly scheduled time.  To complete phase one the offender must 
have started a set of “skill-building” classes and other board recommendations, such as 
the completion of a personal budget or a plan to take a GED exam.  In addition, the 
Passages program fee of $50 had to be paid, though payment of restitution could carry 
over into the next stage.   
 Also during phase one the panel met with offenders in private to assess 
community restitution, a simple application of a formula involving the alleged cost of 
police time and the number of hours used in dealing with the offense.  According to the 
program guidelines, this restitution did not exceed $180 (SLC 2000). Restitution to the 
victim was dealt with case by case. 11  One purpose of the community restitution was to 
bring home the impact that even minor offenses have on the broader community, but a 
second goal was to bring in financial resources for Passages.12 
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Phase two lasted a minimum of three months and required offenders to meet with 
the board once a month. During this time the offender attended either victim-offender 
mediation or, much more commonly, a victim impact panel, in which victims of crimes 
not committed by Passages participants recounted their experiences as victims. Phase 
three also took a minimum of two months and required once-a-month meetings to ensure 
that all program requirements were completed and offenders got in no further trouble. 
The overwhelming majority of participants successfully completed the program.13  The 
program concluded with a formal graduation ceremony where successful participants 
were praised for their work by board members and other figures of authority, such as 
members of the Mayor’s office and the judge supervising the program, who then 
officially dismissed their cases. A month later the party in most cases could also have the 
record of arrest and charges expunged.14 
Professionals and the meaning of community participation 
 The Passages program first provides an opportunity to investigate why 
professionals might want to turn portions of the criminal justice process over to citizens. 
The 1980s critique of informal justice implies a very skeptical answer. The concerns 
about expanding state control and reducing formal legal rights as a source of leverage for 
less powerful groups suggest very undemocratic reasons. These criticisms in their typical 
form, however, are more deduced from a certain theory of the state than based on 
empirical evidence (Cain 1988: 55), much less a theory of individual understandings. As 
discussed above, democratic professionalism does not require altruism and can include 
elements of self-interest. Recognizing that people are not always candid about or even 
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fully aware of their motivations, the results of our interviews are consistent with 
democratic professionalism.  
The four professionals gave various reasons for promoting restorative justice, 
with different emphasis among them. The prosecutor who created the program and was 
its most visible champion articulated the value of democratic participation for its own 
sake very explicitly: 
I don’t think we should underestimate the value of these types of programs for 
community as well.  …  I think you take out of it that, for the first time, that 
romantic version that you see of your government.  The glue that holds our 
civil society together…  If you regionalize it, for example, some communities 
back east, Vermont or Connecticut, they talked about towns and the council 
within that town.  I think those individuals have a sense of ownership of their 
community there.  Under the model that we have now, we don’t have that.     
The judge participating in the program expressed similar democratic sentiments: 
It seems to me that as part of a community, we live together, and we have to 
recognize that everything we do affects the other people.  We’ve chosen to 
live in a society.  I think the value is people being willing to take that time and 
come out and say, “I’m part of this community, and that means I’m part of the 
problem and I’m gonna be part of the solution as well.” 
A second reason articulated was the pragmatic assumption evident in both Dewey 
and restorative justice theory that community members are likely to be more effective 
than professionals in achieving some goals, in this case getting offenders to take personal 
responsibility for their crimes and in reintegrating them back into the community (Dzur 
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and Olson, forthcoming). This comes from the expectation that community members will 
be more “real people” to the offenders, who will identify more with community members 
and care more what they think. The attorneys and the case manager involved in Passages 
all seemed to share this view:  
What happens by bringing the laypeople in and trying to get the lawyers and 
social workers out of the way is that the participants have an opportunity for 
people who are just like them or closer to them in terms of education and 
experience without the specialized legal mode that [X] or I bring to it, people 
who are just like them talking to them in English instead of legalese or social 
workese. 
 
For better or for worse, my position has a stereotype.  [X]’s position has a 
stereotype.  Participants cannot stereotype the community volunteers.  Where 
they have got me and [X] figured out, they haven’t got the other folks figured 
out, and that’s good for them.  It does just enough to make a crack in opening 
the dialogue with the participants. … I get locked up in my professionalism. 
So our perspectives sometimes get skewed. What these citizens offer are fresh 
perspectives. Look at the experience that they bring.  Look at the compassion 
that they bring.  Even though we’re looking at the same phenomenon that’s 
before us, the same individual, we’re listening to the same stories, their 
experiences can enliven and enrich that dialogue and open it up in ways that 
we could not do. 
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The citizen members are “the heart of the community….Although we 
[professionals] may have embraced the thought of restorative justice, I still 
think that often times the people identify more with people of their own kind. 
We’re still kind of authority figures to them. 
 One might expect that professionals would be least likely to acknowledge the 
“security” reason, the value of community involvement for buttressing one’s own 
professional legitimacy, but two of the Passages professionals did so. In the words of the 
participating judge:  
I believe that the input from the community is critical.  We tend to 
compartmentalize.  We say the police arrest people, the courts take care of it, 
and everybody’s happy about that until they see something they don't like.  
Then they blame it on the police, the courts, or the legal profession, or my 
attorney or something.     
The prosecutor noted another way in which he felt community involvement 
increased the legitimacy of his position. He found that the structure of Passages reduced 
the tension on those occasions when he had to “switch hats” from being one of the panel 
members to being more obviously the prosecutor.  
Everybody’s dialoging with this person.  If the conduct brings them where I 
have to don my prosecutor’s hat and remind them of the other stark reality 
which is there, ...the heavy stick of the law, … when I do have to put that hat 
on, the contrast isn’t so great because there are others there who are echoing 
similar ideas.   
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There was also evidence of the “integrity” reason for democratic professionalism. 
The professionals seemed to feel that their work with Passages was more meaningful than 
their typical work. The professionals liked restorative justice’s more holistic, less 
compartmentalized approach to criminal justice. The case manager in Passages 
functioned much like a regular probation officer in interviewing all new participants to do 
the “needs assessment” and being their contact person. Nevertheless, she felt a positive 
difference between Passages and the rest of her work: 
In my role I find myself getting more involved in the community review 
process than I had anticipated that I would. I thought I would be more of a 
silent person, but I guess I find myself as feeling that I’m more part of this 
group. I love interviewing and meeting the people, but what I like the very 
most is feeling that I’m a part of that whole. I’m part of the solution. 
The judge as well noted a similar difference in the feel of her work, which also on 
the surface was not that different from her work in regular probation cases. After 
approving the recommendations for pleas in abeyance, she continued to be available to 
hold non-compliance hearings at the request of the CRP and, if necessary, to impose 
more serious sanctions than the panel had authority to do. If offenders utterly failed to 
comply with the requirements of Passages, they were referred back to the court for entry 
of the conviction and normal sentencing. Nevertheless, the judge felt that the context was 
very different: “We’re all on the same page. It’s not advocacy in the typical sense. It 
really changes the relationship of the attorneys with each other and with me….It’s more 
problem solving.”  
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Although this interaction that the judge felt to be more meaningful than her 
typical work occurred in the context of a program involving citizens, it is important to 
recognize that none of the community members were present for these courtroom 
occasions. This suggests that some of the  “integrity” satisfaction the professionals 
experienced is more related to changed interactions with offenders and other 
professionals than to increased community involvement. This also seems true of the 
defense attorney’s description of his work in the city’s domestic violence court, which 
also didn’t involve community members other than the direct parties. Cases handled 
through that court’s restorative justice program were calendared along with those handled 
conventionally. In the attorney’s words:  
In case number 3 on the calendar, everybody is holding hands and saying 
‘Kumbaya,’ and on the next one we are tied at the wrist and pounding on each 
other. The idea is that one case is restorative and the other case is litigation. 
You need to be able to make that kind of movement back and forth, but it’s 
not easy. 
These comments are a reminder that restorative justice is not only about 
increasing community involvement in criminal justice, but has other substantive values. 
The new ways of interacting with victims and offenders lead to new ways of interacting 
with other professionals, which have both intellectual and affective dimensions. The 
judge’s comment seems to reflect satisfaction from restorative justice because it is more 
holistic and less adversarial, while the defense attorney’s seems to reflect satisfaction 
from new intellectual and emotional challenges raised by the process of restorative 
justice.  
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In sum, in different combinations the professionals involved in Passages 
expressed all the reasons for democratic professionalism discussed above. The citizens’ 
role in the program increased the integrity, the legitimacy, and the efficacy they 
experienced from their involvement in restorative justice. In addition, however, they 
received some of their satisfaction from the changed quality of their interaction with 
offenders and each other. The risk is that the latter source of meaning comes from direct, 
personal involvement rather than from reducing one’s role in the interest of greater 
community participation. Thus, restorative justice may at times trade off other values 
against citizen involvement, the signature value of democratic professionalism.  We see 
more such trade-offs and complexities in the tasks Passages professionals perform in the 
process of engaging citizens in the criminal justice system. 
Roles and challenges of democratic professionals  
 Consistent with democratic professionalism, the professionals involved in 
Passages undertook the new role of facilitator of community involvement. This role 
involves several distinct tasks, such as getting community members to participate and 
attending to the quality of their participation, which is a function of both who the 
community members are and how the community board meetings run. Quality of lay 
participation is crucial from the perspective of democratic professionalism, since merely 
symbolic task sharing—where citizens are present but have no real authority--is worse 
than no task sharing at all. As professionals, however, they also continue to have 
substantive value commitments consistent with their training. Balancing these value 
commitments with the commitment to community involvement is a major challenge for 
democratic professionals. 
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Conventional criminal justice today is largely a professionalized arena, and where 
community members do have roles open to them—as jurors and witnesses—they are 
“recruited” for them by means of summons and subpoenas. In contrast, democratic 
professionals seeking community involvement in restorative justice must recruit 
volunteers for the community review panel and victim impact panel. The Passages case 
manager gave presentations at a number of community meetings asking for volunteers 
and was disappointed at the response, so the prosecutor weighed in with personal contacts 
to solicit others. Five individuals attended at least one CRP meeting, but the number soon 
dropped to the three regular participants. Two individuals regularly represented victims 
on the victim impact panel.15 While this number sufficed for the first sixteen months of 
the program, all seemed aware that the number needed to increase if the program was to 
grow without exhausting its volunteers, suggesting that community recruitment is an on-
going task.  
Facilitating community involvement as a democratic professional also means 
being concerned about whether participants are representative of the larger community. 
In this start-up phase Passages took virtually whomever it could get to volunteer, but the 
professionals were conscious of the importance of representativeness. As one said:  
I think on a practical level, in one sense I can never represent the community 
wholly, I don’t have a board big enough.  I don’t have the numbers that I 
would need for that democratic process by which I would have the whole 
community there.  So the next thing that you need to start to achieve is to 
distill out of it participants who want to participate in fair cross section.  
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This individual felt generally satisfied with the diversity achieved. Of the six original 
participants on the board, one community member was Hispanic, and one of the 
professionals was a first-generation Asian-American.  
Another type of diversity is economic.  All three community members lived or 
worked on the traditionally low-income side of Salt Lake, which was true of only some of 
the offenders in the program, given the predominance of shop-lifting cases. Nevertheless, 
one of the professionals was not satisfied with the economic diversity of the board:  
My concept of community is probably a little socioeconomic-centric.  My 
focus is there is a large segment of the community that is not heard from and 
usually only interacts with the majority of the community when they’re in 
trouble or when they’re using food stamps. … I’d say that our current panel is 
a little middle class for my taste, but it’s difficult to get people from the very 
high end of the socioeconomic scale because they’re already involved with 
different panels and so forth.  It’s difficult to get people on the lower end to 
get involved because they’re busy surviving. … I would love to see a blue-
collar component.  I don’t know how to go about recruiting them.  
Recruitment of volunteers is one area in which professionals’ substantive values 
may compete with their commitment to citizen participation for its own sake. The 
professionals were able to screen out volunteers with attitudes they felt were 
inappropriate. The case manager recalled rejecting one individual who expressed interest. 
She viewed him as having a “personal platform that he wanted to take and use.” The man 
had been imprisoned and won release on appeal, and she feared that “he might be a type 
of person that may have a bias against the system. We didn’t want our program to turn 
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into one of those things that people are bashing our system and paying it disrespect 
because it still is the justice system that we have. While it has its flaws, it also serves a 
purpose.” The screening out of volunteers in this way suggests the limits on how far some 
professionals are willing to go in relinquishing power. 
All three of the regular community participants evidenced restorative values 
compatible with the program and the professionals’ values.  One board member was 
actively engaged in prison advocacy work. Another was a former youth corrections 
counselor more recently employed as a school counselor. The third, a long-time 
participant in neighborhood politics and chair of a community council, had no prior 
involvement with the criminal justice system, but also took a fairly therapeutic approach 
to the program. When asked about what kinds of people would be appropriate community 
representatives for a program like Passages, he commented: “I’d look for people who 
have an attitude toward wanting to help others.  I certainly would eliminate those who 
just want to punish them.  You can’t whip a kid all the time and hope that he’ll keep on 
right.”  
Besides recruiting volunteers, another job of democratic professionals is to 
educate community members about relevant issues so that they are better able to 
participate in decision making. The professionals provided two training sessions for the 
volunteers about restorative justice generally and the specific goals and functioning of 
Passages. Substantive values also enter training, of course. For the defense attorney the 
need for education arose primarily around the issue of the offenders’ rights. With the 
minor level of offenses committed by the Passages participants in its first months, this 
was not a major issue, but the defense attorney anticipated that if more serious cases were 
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admitted, he would see it as part of his role to “educate” the community members about 
“what may happen” and “what the options are” and to ensure that the program is “not just 
a vigilante committee.” If a problem arose, he was able to handle it on the spot. On one 
occasion, with the concurrence of the participating prosecutor, he took one of the 
offenders who had recently received additional charges into the hall briefly to counsel her 
not to discuss those new charges in front of the panel. 
Democratic professionals must constantly negotiate the ambiguity between tasks 
they should retain and those that could be done by community members and must be 
vigilant about their own tendencies to take over. One community member admitted to 
feeling “overwhelmed” by the attorneys initially, but felt much less so after a year on the 
board. The Salt Lake professionals clearly understood this problem. In the words of the 
defense attorney:  
One of our goals…is to get the lawyers and the social workers out of the way. 
In other words, to get a big enough and an experienced enough group of 
panelists that I can come in and make an introduction, [“M”] can do the case 
management, but it is literally the citizens who are running the show. The 
citizens don’t tend to be as forward or as outspoken as the lawyers. So I have 
to pay particular attention. I have to actively get out of the way of the panel 
and let them do their job. 
Even with conscious effort, however, the right balance is not necessarily struck 
and must be renegotiated. About six months into the program the defense attorney 
suggested that the members take turns in initiating the conversation with each different 
offender. Who will “take” whom began to be decided during the half hour the panel met 
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before the offenders entered the room. In the course of the conversations, other board 
members often joined in. The two attorneys on the panel continued to dominate the 
discussion somewhat throughout the observation period. For example, one or the other of 
them and usually the defense attorney regularly did the fairly lengthy introduction given 
each time a new offender joined the program, which explained the consequences of a 
conviction for even a minor offense and thus the benefits of completing the program. The 
presentation had the feel of an attorney advising his clients. Nevertheless, in the interview 
one of the community members suggested that he or she could do the introduction just as 
well. Discussion and renegotiation of citizen-professional interactions continued after the 
period of our observation, and the relationships evolved further (see fn. 20). 
Democratic professionals spark lay participation, but must be careful that lay 
people turn to themselves for answers rather than rely on those who encouraged them to 
participate, trained them, and guided them in the early stages.  Giving up control may 
especially be difficult if professionals find community members do not share the values 
that they as professionals are committed to defending (Marshall 1988: 38). In practice, 
there is always a temptation to recruit selectively, to educate about the substance of issues 
more than the processes for deliberation, and to take over when things aren’t going the 
way they would like. The challenge for democratic professionals is to balance their 
commitment to public participation and to other core values. From the perspective of 
democratic professionalism, producing these substantive purposes and ends for the public 
is still too close to the technocratic removal of problems from the ken of lay people.  
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Alternative Models for Democratic Professionals in Restorative Justice 
The structure of Passages, in which professionals sat side-by-side with 
community members as part of the CRP, makes taking over very easy or, indeed, makes 
not taking over quite difficult. This structure, however, is not the only way for 
professionals to organize restorative justice and facilitate community involvement in 
criminal justice. For purposes of comparison, we present a brief description of 
“community reparative boards” (CRBs) in the state of Vermont, which differ somewhat 
from Salt Lake’s approach, and an even briefer note of restorative justice programs with a 
different concept of community. These alternative models perhaps come closer to ideals 
of democratic professionalism. 
Begun in 1994 and continuing to grow statewide, Vermont’s CRBs are very 
similar to Passages in concept. A board of five or six citizens meets with offenders and 
imposes on them sanctions such as community service, victim reparations, and formal or 
informal apologies.16  The reasoning behind the Vermont program has been expressly 
articulated and closely tracks the mix of pragmatism and idealism of democratic 
professionalism. First is the sense that the conventional correctional sanctions are not the 
most effective response to nonviolent crimes (Perry and Gorczyk 1997, 32). Second, in 
efficiency terms, involvement of citizens in dealing with nonviolent crime can “free up 
scarce court and correctional resources to meet the more urgent priorities of determining 
justice and providing sanctions and services in cases involving more serious crimes” 
(Dooley 1995, 33).  Third, this division of labor is also characterized in democratic terms, 
as giving power and responsibility back to citizens.  In the words of John Perry, director 
of planning for the Vermont Department of Corrections, “There's a hunger for local 
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control over justice.  We've done a pretty good job of taking justice away from the local 
communities. This process allows it to go back to the level that it probably ought to be at” 
(Stone 2001).  
There are several important differences in the role professionals play in Vermont, 
compared to Salt Lake. Because the Vermont boards operate post-conviction, rather than 
through a plea in abeyance, they are administered by the state Department of Corrections. 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys have little involvement with the boards, though 
obviously the charges prosecutors bring largely determine if offenders will be eligible for 
reparative rather than conventional probation. Most importantly, no professionals from 
the Department of Corrections sit on the community boards. Nevertheless, professionals 
still largely perform the same roles as the Passages case manager and several of the 
functions that we have identified as part of the task of facilitating community or citizen 
participation, but some they do more indirectly.  
First, they take responsibility for staffing the boards and attending to their 
representativeness. Except for the much larger scale of the Vermont program, there is 
little difference in this task. As CRBs have spread across the state, the Department of 
Corrections has become more interested in the diversity of boards.17 In a Department of 
Corrections directive representativeness is defined as follows: A board “should be as 
diverse a group as is the community in the areas of economic status, gender, age, ethnic 
background, religious preference” (Vermont Department of Corrections 1997, 11).  
Additionally, ex-offenders, people who have been crime victims, those with a history of 
community service or who represent key community institutions, and people with a 
 40 
commitment to restorative justice principles are seen as adding to the diversity of the 
board. 
The Vermont professionals also juggle their commitment to democratic and other 
substantive values, but they do so through training and written guidelines rather than 
through direct participation.18 “Retributive,” “punitive,” and “offender-based” 
perspectives are seen as in tension with the value of restoration, and the professionals 
attempt to correct or modify these perspectives either in pre-board or follow-up training 
of board members. As Walther and Perry (1997, 12) wrote in a third-year review of the 
Vermont program, “Some Board members have exhibited punitive activity (at worst), and 
offender-based goals (at best), rather than restorative, inclusive values.  We believe this 
behavior will change with the pressure of peer reviews and inservice training.”  
The Department also tries to guide the boards in the particularly legal value of 
fairness to the offenders, just as the defense attorney in Passages did. Because the 
Vermont program is post-conviction, its fairness issues mainly relate to the nature of the 
sanction. A “program directive” has established standards of fairness, equity, and 
relevance for the tasks mandated for the offender by the board.19  
Ironically, when a program has become as institutionalized as Vermont’s has, 
democratic professionalism may also require attention to professionalizing tendencies 
among board members themselves. Professionalization has been of increasing concern in 
Vermont, where board members have now organized email networks and annual 
conferences.  Some boards have asked to be paid, not just for the money but also for the 
status a paid position conveys to those offenders who might challenge the authority of 
unpaid volunteers.  In reaction to these developments both the Commissioner of 
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Corrections and the department’s director of planning expressed in interviews an interest 
in discouraging “little judges” and in maintaining the informality of boards by “building 
inefficiency into the system,” perhaps by making service on reparative boards paid but 
also mandatory and time-limited. 
 Although both the Vermont and Salt Lake professionals recruit and guide 
community volunteers, the more “behind the scenes” approach in Vermont seems to have 
some advantages from the perspective of democratic professionalism over the more 
“hands-on” approach in Salt Lake City.  Restorative justice has substantive values and 
goals, apart from the democratic goal of more citizen involvement, including support for 
victims, fair treatment of offenders, and more understanding and cooperative 
relationships among all parties. The Vermont approach allows professionals to pursue 
these other values through guidelines and training at less risk to their commitment to 
democratic participation, although possibly with some loss of the sense of meaning 
arising from richer personal interactions.20 
The tasks for democratic professionals of recruiting participants and monitoring 
diversity and quality of participation are functions of the general approach to restorative 
justice shared by both Salt Lake and Vermont. This is a “panel” model that attempts to 
incorporate community involvement through members of the general public who have no 
direct connection to the particular offenders or offenses at hand. An alternative approach 
are “stakeholder” models, such as “family group conferences” (Bazemore 1998), in 
which “the community” consists of intimate acquaintances of the victim and offender. 
Restorative justice professionals may find themselves with different tasks and challenges 
in such programs. 
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Some restorative justice advocates have criticized the “panel” approach for 
substituting members of the general public for more direct stakeholders (Bazemore 1998; 
Bazemore and Umbreit 2001: 4). Even the direct victims of the offenses may be absent, 
as is largely the case in both the Salt Lake and Vermont programs. The original design of 
Passages anticipated victim-offender mediations as an important part of the program, to 
be conducted by the case manager, a trained mediator. In fact, however, only three such 
mediations took place in Passages’ early months, and victims were much less involved 
than the program’s formal goals anticipated. The main reason is that very few of the 
offenses had individual victims, and only one commercial victim in a shoplifting or 
employee theft case agreed to participate in mediation.21 The individuals on the victim 
impact panel, which offenders attended unless they had a mediation with their direct 
victims, spoke poignantly of their experiences and seemed to touch at least some of the 
Passages participants, despite the differences between the crimes they committed and 
those the victims experienced, but the potential for a transformative effect on the offender 
is surely less than in victim-offender mediation. 
The Vermont reparative probation program clearly seeks to have victims attend 
the board meetings. Guidelines provide suggestions for attending to them, such as “Greet 
Victim/affected parties respectfully and inclusively,” “Assure that the victim is not 
interrupted while telling her/his story,” “Validate victim’s feelings and questions,” 
“Assure that offender answers all questions that victim asks of him/her” (Vermont 
Department of Corrections 1999). Nevertheless, relatively few victims have participated. 
Two sources report victims attending board meetings in eleven percent and eighteen 
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percent of the cases with identified victims.22 The lack of victim participation was a point 
of self-criticism in both Vermont and Salt Lake.23 
In programs where victims and other direct stakeholders are present, professionals 
often find themselves playing another new role, that of mediator. The growth of 
mediation between victim and offender, sometimes also including concerned community 
members on both sides, has spawned protracted debate over issues arising from this new 
role, including appropriate credentials and training, tensions between maintaining 
neutrality and promoting substantive justice, and appropriate cases for mediation 
(McGillis 1997: 67-72; Shook and Milner 1993). Democratic professionals in such 
programs may not have to worry about recruiting volunteers or whether those volunteers 
are somehow representative of a larger community, but they still face the challenge of 
enabling and directing lay participation without dominating it. 
Learning about Restorative Justice Theory through Democratic Professionalism. 
Despite its frequent assumptions to the contrary, we conclude that restorative 
justice needs the involvement of criminal justice professionals for several different 
reasons. First, for the foreseeable future, restorative justice is unlikely to happen without 
them. Restorative justice theory tends to assume that restorative justice programs give 
back something the community wants, namely direct, hands-on, control of criminal 
justice decision making.  What we see in practice, however, is a different story.  Despite 
reasonable initial recruitment efforts, Passages found only three steady volunteers and 
thus went through its first sixteen months with the same three citizens representing the 
entire community. Even in Vermont, where the community boards have now spread 
statewide and involve some hundreds of volunteers, citizen involvement was “seeded” in 
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a top-down fashion by professionals of the Department of Corrections. In no way did 
reparative probation as a program idea emerge from the bottom up, through social 
movement or normal politics, even in a state with a long history of local self-government 
and participatory politics.  
A restorative justice “true believer” may agree that such involvement is needed at 
the outset of restorative justice programs, but once that stage has passed, the community 
will take back what is deservedly theirs.  We see it differently.  Generating sufficient 
citizen involvement in most communities is something that may involve considerable 
long-term social change to accomplish, even with the concerted efforts of democratic 
professionals.  At a time when it is hard for even the most devoted local party activist to 
get fifty percent of a neighborhood to turn out to vote in a presidential election year--even 
given a stable party system, with established political networks at the national, state, and 
local levels--we wonder whether “giving back” the criminal justice system is as easy as it 
sounds.   
Another questionable assumption is that all the tasks to be done can be done by 
volunteers.  Even beyond a possible transition stage to restorative justice, we see 
evidence that restorative justice programs usher in new tasks and new burdens for some 
particular group to master.  Because tasks like mediation and facilitation of community 
involvement are different but no less complex and burdensome than traditional criminal 
justice tasks, it seems sociologically sound to suppose that some professional 
involvement will likely be a long-term and not temporary phenomenon.   
The role of facilitator also includes finding political support for community 
involvement in hitherto professionally dominated institutions. Just as Feeley and Rubin 
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(1998) found with respect to prisons, reformers could not conceivably transform the 
criminal justice system towards restorative justice without the support and cooperation of 
some of the professionals now in charge to provide legitimacy with political decision 
makers. 
Not only are there new tasks to perform that may require training and time 
commitments, there are also traditional tasks and values associated with criminal justice, 
with which professionals are particularly associated, that rival the tasks and values of 
restorative justice.  Restorative justice theory notwithstanding, it is not clear that 
traditional tasks like appraising offenders and ensuring procedural fairness should 
disappear or be done any less professionally than currently (Luna 2001; Clear and Karp 
1998; Cain 1988, 83). Because the value of holistic restorative justice practices does not 
“trump” all the values of specialized conventional justice, it is very likely that some 
criminal justice tasks will be always be guided by traditional norms whether or not these 
tasks are performed directly by professionals, as in Salt Lake, or guided through policies 
and training, as in Vermont.  
Both professionals and community volunteers can encounter something of a “two-
hats” problem. Because they want to uphold traditional as well as restorative values, they 
sometimes have to perform contradictory tasks.  In Salt Lake, for example, the 
professionals involved tried to represent themselves in offender-board dialogue as both 
community members and professionals.  As a community member they “relate,” but as 
professionals they introduce the program to new offenders in expert terms like “class B” 
offenses.”  In Vermont we observed as a board member evoked her status as a member of 
the community by saying she “lived on Elm Avenue and ran a nearby market,” but who 
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also clearly followed precedents of board practice and the procedural guidelines set out 
for board-offender dialogue.  Both hats are needed, but they add to the complexity of 
restorative justice roles: community members do not just act the way they would in their 
family room, but follow rules; professionals do not just act they way they would in court, 
but follow the new rules of restorative justice processes. 
Democratic professionals explicitly seek to balance these competing values of 
rule-following versus holistic engagement and of fairness to individuals versus 
responsiveness to community. The exact role they play, e.g., how much time a 
democratic professional needs to spend in the foreground, will vary with the context. A 
possible reason for Vermont’s adoption of a program structure more closely adhering to 
democratic professionalism is the different political culture of the states.  The structure of 
the Vermont community reparative boards may reflect the state’s history of town-meeting 
participation, a history that gave the department of corrections professionals confidence 
in the possibilities of community involvement in criminal justice.  Moreover, that the Salt 
Lake offenders are under a plea in abeyance increased the need for the Salt Lake 
professionals to be available to resume their unique role of enforcing law or protecting 
rights. In short, we see democratic professionalism as conducive to the development of 
restorative justice. Its exact form may differ with the social and political context, but 
some organizational configurations advantage certain values over others. 
Restorative Justice, Democratic Professionalism and Informal Justice 
 Can incorporating democratic professionalism into the theory and practice of 
restorative justice programs avoid the problems raised by critics of informal justice?  A 
full assessment of restorative justice as an improvement on the informal justice programs 
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of the 1970s and 1980s is beyond the scope of this paper.  An overall assessment requires 
attention to offenders and victims, of course, not just to the role of professionals.24 In 
addition, attention is needed to the differences among the wide range of restorative justice 
programs in this country and elsewhere. Especially programs like those in Salt Lake and 
Vermont, where direct victims are usually absent, raise questions about what exactly is 
being “restored” and how much they differ from other rehabilitative programs that 
attempt to make offenders less self-centered. Nevertheless, we feel our study speaks to 
some aspects of the concerns about informal justice. 
 To the extent that Passages, with its three “phases” and mandatory classes and 
board meetings, is quite an elaborate program for sometimes very minor offenses, 
skepticism is warranted that its version of restorative justice is, once again, an extension 
of state control. For this not to be true, the validity of community involvement and the 
respect for individual rights are both crucial. The role of democratic professionals is 
important on both fronts. As democratic professionals, those involved in restorative 
justice are responsible for ensuring that the core legal value of fairness to offenders is not 
sacrificed. As democratic professionals, they are responsible for nurturing citizen 
participation in the process.  
The theory of democratic professionalism and our empirical observations suggest 
that non-altruistic reasons help support this second goal. The professionals felt that 
working with the citizens made their work more meaningful and more legitimate. The 
progress the community members made in shouldering a fair share of the conversation 
with offenders and even in questioning the professionals’ dominance in that process 
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suggests that conscious attention to these issues produces more valid community 
involvement.  
If criminal justice professionals interested in restorative justice are to become 
democratic professionals, new forms of training and standards of accountability are 
needed. Training in the facilitation of community participation (see Lopez 1992) needs to 
become as common as mediation training now is.  New standards of accountability 
clearly need to be worked out for assessing how well democratic professionals 
accomplish the array of new tasks, how well they are able to manage tensions between 
competing values, and how agile they are at stepping in and out of the foreground of 
public action. 
Under democratic professionalism accountability has to focus not on current 
professional standards of performance of defined tasks, but on citizen satisfaction with 
crime reduction and other improvements in their community (Karp and Clear 2000). At 
worst this raises the specter of public relations activity, on the one hand, and technocratic 
professionalism, on the other.  Democratic professionals’ imperative of avoiding 
technocratic tendencies, however, makes them quite sensitive to the problems raised by 
such critics. Moreover, our analysis has been that they need to be held accountable both 
to a standard of facilitating active citizenship in the public sphere as well as to the 
standard of protecting rights and procedural fairness, presumably through the courts.  If 
they are so accountable, then we believe restorative justice programs can avoid a number 
of the problems raised by critics of informal justice.   
Of course, when examining accountability to citizens, it is not always easy to 
determine where the state ends and the public sphere begins.  While we have presented a 
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more optimistic vision of the professional-dominated realm of governmentality than 
Foucaultians such as Pavlich (1996) and Fitzpatrick (1988), we join them in holding that 
state and community control are not clearly delineated.  In the restorative justice program 
we have observed, the relative “competencies, knowledges, and privileges” of 
professionals and community members are being gradually negotiated and defined 
through practice.   
To further examine these questions theoretically and empirically, we urge the 
community of law and society scholars to return to the study of informal justice, 
including the burgeoning restorative justice programs. The practical choices democratic 
professionals are currently making in contexts like those examined here will also 
contribute to the further development of the theory of democratic professionalism.   
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 This paper is the product of equal contribution from both authors. Contact Susan Olson at 
susan.olson@utah.edu and Albert Dzur at awdzur@bgnet.bgsu.edu. We would like to thank Christine 
Harrington for her comments on an earlier draft. We wish to thank the members of the Passages citizen 
review board for welcoming us into their deliberations every other week for sixteen months. 
1 See Van Ness and Strong (1997) for a brief history of restorative justice in North America and 
Braithwaite (2002) for a more global history of restorative justice. 
2 Such “private justice” was not always peaceful, however, and sometimes did include blood revenge. See 
Miller (1990, chapters 6-8). 
3 Parsons’ emphasis on the normative orientation of professions towards socially responsible ends rather 
than merely pecuniary ends is a standard account (see, e.g., Friedson 1970, xvii; Friedson 1994, 10; Hughes 
1963, 655; Sullivan 1995, 2).   
4 As Brint puts this point: “Community was understood as the aggregation of socially important functions, 
not as some more general kinship….  Each profession was understood to work on a single important sphere 
of social life—such as conflict resolution, health, design, education” (1994, 7).   
5 See Dorf and Sabel (1998) for further discussion of the legitimacy-granting effects of bringing local 
knowledges into expert decision making. Rooted in Dewey’s pragmatism, their “democratic 
experimentalism” has close similarities to the approach we advocate here. We thank John Braithwaite for 
drawing our attention to their work. 
6 In the summer of 2002 the city of Salt Lake created its own limited jurisdiction “Justice Court,” as 
provided by state law. Subsequently, the types of cases referred to Passages came from this new city court 
rather than from the state district court. 
7 Usually the offenders were identified at the time of arraignment and entered the plea without consulting 
counsel. Willingness to accept responsibility for the act was one of the conditions for being considered a 
good candidate for Passages. 
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8 To be eligible, offenders also had to have a stable address and be either residents of Salt Lake County or 
have committed the crime within Salt Lake City. 
9 Backgrounds of the community members are discussed below at page 35. 
10 This may be because it was a new program and not well advertised or widely known and also perhaps 
because it was housed in the slightly forbidding Criminal Justice Services building. 
11 Many offenders owed no victim restitution through Passages because the merchandise was recovered in 
virtually all the shoplift cases. The businesses, however, also have the right to pursue offenders for civil 
damages under Utah law. 
12 In public presentations about the program, the prosecutor stressed its cost effectiveness, always an 
important political message in Utah. He compared its costs to that of trying defendants, even though it is 
unclear how many Passages participants would be likely to have gone to trial. 
13 Only two of the thirty-five were referred back to court and one participant died, but several were still in 
progress at the end of our observation period. Beyond the thirty-five counted, four more offenders had been 
referred to Passages, but did not show up for their initial appointment with the case manager and thus 
presumably were sentenced by the judge. During the early period in which we observed it, Passages had 
made no provision for tracking offender recidivism. 
14 As provided in Utah Code Annotated 77-18-11 (1953). If done correctly, expungement should be 
absolute, but the process is quite cumbersome, and some offenders may fail to contact each of the necessary 
agencies to do it completely. 
15 One was a home-owner whose house had been repeatedly broken into and who narrowly missed being 
the victim of a drive-by shooting. The other was a woman whose experiences with her husband, whose 
substance abuse problems had repeatedly gotten him in trouble with the law, demonstrated offenders’ 
victimization of their own family members. 
16 The Vermont program has been in operation long enough that there are several published sources about it 
(see Karp [2001 and 2002] and works cited in our discussion). In addition, one of the authors has 
interviewed Vermont state officials about the program and observed one board meeting.  
17 The initial selection of board members was done using a very informal word of mouth process.  
Department of Corrections staff asked community leaders to nominate people for the boards.  Further 
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recruitment has been done through word-of-mouth and some newspaper advertising and reporting. Because 
of the recruitment process CRBs initially slightly over-represented people who had had some connection to 
the criminal justice system, such as retired case-managers or previous volunteers.  CRB membership 
clearly favors those with the time and income security for community service. 
18 The Department of Corrections articulates five steps written in training materials as semi-formal 
guidelines: 1) victims describe the impact of the offender’s behavior; 2) offenders make amends to victims 
and affected parties; 3) offenders make amends to the community; 4) offenders demonstrate healthy 
behaviors and learn ways to avoid re-offending; 5) the community offers reintegration. 
19 Fairness means that tasks should be “scheduled and assigned so as to consider the offender’s basic 
responsibility to work and provide for family, and not unduly interfere with these responsibilities.” Equity 
means that tasks should be modulated to accord in severity with the offense committed and that they should 
be applied consistently to those who have committed the same offense. Relevance means that tasks should 
be “based on the nature of the act itself” and “be closely associated to and right the specific harm caused” 
(Vermont Department of Corrections 1997, 9).    
20 Indeed, the Passages program seemed to be moving somewhat closer to the Vermont approach. The 
program was still very much in flux at the time we observed it, and the professional roles were changing as 
a result of explicit discussion and personnel turnover. By the summer of 2002 two of the original 
community members had left the board and other new ones were recruited to sustain the program. The 
attorneys who had replaced the two founders no longer sat at the front table with the community members, 
but off on the side. The new attorneys seemed to be backing away from trying to interact informally with 
offenders, as if they were no different from the community members. 
21 The second mediation involved a shoplifter who got into a physical altercation with a female security 
guard, who agreed to participate in mediation.  The third involved a young man who terrified his party 
host’s neighbors and trampled their plants as he mistook their house for the host’s and tried to get in while 
very drunk. Even in the four employee theft cases, where there was a personal relationship between the 
offender and commercial victim, the retailers simply fired the employees and declined to mediate. 
22 The eighteen percent figure comes from a personal communication from Lynne Walther of the Vermont 
Department of Corrections (April 3, 2002) and the eleven percent from Karp’s study (2001).  
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23 On Vermont, see Walther and Perry (1997: 26-27). In Salt Lake some of the professionals and 
community board members were unhappy about the lack of mediations with direct victims and felt the 
prosecutor was being too cautious about the types of cases referred. 
24 Considerable general evaluative research on restorative justice has been done. See, for example, Umbreit, 
Coates, and Roberts (2000), Umbreit (2001), and Coates (1990).  
